## RELEASED IN FULL

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ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 CIAE-00 OASY-00 DODE-00 H-01 L-01

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FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0260 INFO AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY

RWANDA COLLECTIVE

CONFIDENTIAL KINSHASA 001038

E.O.L2356: DECL: OADR TAGS: MOPS, PREL, RW, CG

SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON THE ISSUE OF DESTRUCTION OF EX-FAR

EQUIPMENT IN ZAIRE

REF: STATE 45524

- 1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
- 2. REFTEL DISCUSSES FATE OF EX-FAR APC'S AND OTHER HEAVY MILITARY EQUIPMENT SEIZED BY ZAIRIAN FORCES AT THE TIME THE EX-FAR CROSSED INTO ZAIRE LAST YEAR. REFTEL INSTRUCTS EMBASSY KIGALI TO APPROACH THE GOR TO ASK IF THE GOR WANTS USG ASSISTANCE TO CONVINCE THE GOZ TO CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 KINSHA 01038 271126Z DESTROY IN PLACE EX-FAR APC'S AND OTHER EQUIPMENT.

## **UNCLASSIFIED**

- 3. FROM KINSHASA'S PERSPECTIVE, THIS CABLE RAISES SOME QUESTIONS, THE ANSWERS TO WHICH ARE NOT EVIDENT. FIRST OF ALL, THE CABLE NOTES REPORTS THAT EX-FAR EQUIPMENT MAY HAVE LEFT CANTONMENT SITES FOR POINTS UNKNOWN. IN FACT, WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE (REPORTED IN KINSHASA DAO CHANNELS) THAT SOME OF THIS EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN APPROPRIATED BY THE FAZ AND BROUGHT IN SOME INSTANCES TO DSP CAMPS IN AND AROUND KINSHASA. WE PRESUME THIS WILL CONTINUE.
- 4. GIVEN FAZ NEED FOR EQUIPMENT, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE GOZ WOULD RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE SUGGESTION THAT THEY DESTROY WHAT THE EX-FAR HAVE BROUGHT OVER. GOZ TITLE TO MILITARY EQUIPMENT BROUGHT INTO THE COUNTRY IN THIS FASHION WOULD SEEM TO BE CLEAR ENOUGH IF THEY CHOSE TO EXERCISE IT -- WHICH SURREPTITIOUSLY THEY SEEM TO BE DOING.
- 5. RAISING THE QUESTION DIRECTLY MIGHT EASILY LEAD INTO AN UNHELPFUL ARGUMENT. WE HAVE BEEN EXPLICIT IN OUR DESIRE THAT THE GOZ SEIZE EX-FAR MILITARY EQUIPMENT, BUT OUR OWN DESIRE NOT TO SEE THE FAZ (ESPECIALLY THE PRESIDENTIAL DSP) INCREASE IN STRENGTH MAKES IT DIFFICULT EXPLICITLY TO ENCOURAGE THE GOZ TO CONTINUE INTEGRATION OF SUCH EQUIPMENT INTO FAZ UNITS. PERHAPS WE COULD SUGGEST THAT SUCH EQUIPMENT BE MOVED FARTHER FROM THE BORDER SO AS TO SECURE IT AGAINST EX-FAR ACCESS. WHAT HAPPENS TO IT THEN WOULD BE BEYOND OUR SUPERVISION OR DIRECT OBSERVATION.

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6. REPORTS OF EX-FAR TRAINING IN ZAIRE AND ORGANIZED INCURSIONS BY EX-FAR FROM ZAIRE INTO RWANDA ARE NOT WELL SUBSTANTIATED. THEY SEEM FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE TO BE NOT MUCH MORE CREDIBLE THAN REPORTS OF FRENCH AND CHINESE TRAINING IN EASTERN ZAIRE. IF DEPARTMENT HAS SOLID INFORMATION ON THESE MATTERS NOT KNOWN TO US, OR BELIEVES THAT THE INFORMATION WHICH WE BOTH ALREADY HAVE IS MORE CONVINCING THAN WE BELIEVE, PLEASE LET US KNOW.

7. OUR DEFENSE ATTACHE IS SCHEDULED TO VIST THE REGULAR ZAIRIAN FORCES STATIONED IN GOMA AND BUKAVU -- PLUS THE DSP FORCES SUPPORTING UNHER -- BEGINNING MARCH 6. THIS TRIP IS BEING FULLY COORDINATED WITH THE ZAIRIAN DOD AND SO FAR THEY ARE PROVING TO BE VERY COOPERATIVE. WE EXPECT THAT LTCOL BECKA WILL BE ABLE TO OFFER FURTHER INSIGHTS INTO THE ISSUE OF EX-FAR EQUIPMENT AND RELATED QUESTIONS UPON HER RETURN.

8. WE SUGGEST THAT ANY APPROACH TO THE GOR ON THIS ISSUE BE DELAYED UNTIL WE HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO RECEIVE THE RESULTS OF THE DAO VISIT TO THE EAST. YATES

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